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Abstract
Firms that engage in innovative product development, as measured by the fraction of their investment that
goes to Research and Development (R&D) activities, earn higher risk-adjusted equity returns. A portfolio that
goes long the most innovative and shorts the least innovative firms earns a risk-adjusted return in excess of 7%
per annum. R&D-intensive firms also tend to charge higher price markups. Combining insights from
industrial organization with a production-based asset pricing framework, I propose a model in which
heterogeneous firms produce vertically differentiated goods and market them to heterogeneous consumers.
Firms are subject to aggregate demand and supply shocks, which are both priced by investors, and thus the
return premium of innovative firms is explained by their differential exposures to these shocks. In addition to
explaining this return spread, the model makes predictions on firm investments, future profit markups, and
firm size that are consistent with the data.
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Abstract
Firms that engage in innovative product development, as measured by the frac-
tion of their investment that goes to Research and Development (R&D) activities,
earn higher risk-adjusted equity returns. A portfolio that goes long the most inno-
vative and shorts the least innovative ﬁrms earns a risk-adjusted return in excess
of 7% per annum. R&D-intensive ﬁrms also tend to charge higher price markups.
Combining insights from industrial organization with a production-based asset
pricing framework, I propose a model in which heterogeneous ﬁrms produce ver-
tically diﬀerentiated goods and market them to heterogeneous consumers. Firms
are subject to aggregate demand and supply shocks, which are both priced by
investors, and thus the return premium of innovative ﬁrms is explained by their
diﬀerential exposures to these shocks. In addition to explaining this return spread,
the model makes predictions on ﬁrm investments, future proﬁt markups, and ﬁrm
size that are consistent with the data.
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1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) activities are widely cited as a key driver of both ﬁrm-speciﬁc
technological progress and aggregate economic growth. R&D is becoming an increasingly important
investment activity for private corporations in particular, as ﬁrms shift from dependence on physi-
cal capital to intangible and knowledge capital (Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2005)). This shift is
perhaps best illustrated by the change in investment composition: Figure 1 plots the cumulative
growth in both physical capital investment and R&D investment over time. Growth in R&D in-
vestment has clearly and signiﬁcantly outpaced growth in physical investment, a trend that holds
across industries and ﬁrm size. For example, manufacturing ﬁrms alone now spend over $100 billion
in R&D annually, more than the (inﬂation-adjusted) R&D spending of the entire public and private
sectors 40 years ago. Both within industries and across industries, there is signiﬁcant variation in
how much investment ﬁrms attribute to R&D.
Figure 1: Cumulative Growth in Average Investment per Firm
This paper shows that ﬁrms that devote more of their investment to R&D activities earn higher
risk-adjusted equity returns. It also rationalizes this ﬁnding with a model featuring heterogeneous
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ﬁrms and heterogeneous consumers which generates a risk premium for R&D through a novel
product market channel. In examining returns to R&D investments, this paper compares those
returns to returns on the most signiﬁcant other form of investment: investments in physical capital.
To this end, the measure of a ﬁrm's R&D intensity employed in this analysis will be the fraction
of total investment expense in a given year allocated to R&D. This metric is clearly an important
determinant for ﬁrm equity returns: Figure 2 plots the cumulative annual stock returns for ﬁrms
with low levels of R&D/total investment, ﬁrms with high levels of R&D/total investment, and the
aggregate value-weighted market. Firms with a higher ratio of R&D/investment earn signiﬁcantly
higher cumulative returns.
Figure 2: Portfolio Cumulative Excess Returns to $1 invested in January 1962
Are these returns compensation for risk? This paper shows that standard risk factors do not
explain these returns. Relative to the most common models for expected returns in the literature,
ﬁrms that allocate most of their investment towards R&D continue to earn higher returns than
predicted. Speciﬁcally, these ﬁrms generate an annual return over 7% higher than that predicted
by the Fama-French 3-factor model and an annual return that is 10% above the expected return
predicted by the Fama-French 5-factor model. In any rational asset pricing framework, these excess
3
returns must be attributable to some risk factor not spanned by these existing models. Moreover,
this paper ﬁnds that the risk factor captured by the R&D/investment ratio is important not only
to understand the returns of R&D-intensive ﬁrms, but also to understand the entire cross-section of
stock returns. In Fama-MacBeth tests, the risk factor embedded in these high R&D-intensity ﬁrms
has a positive and signiﬁcant price of risk for the entire cross-section.
To understand the risks of these high-R&D ﬁrms, it is important to ﬁrst understand why ﬁrms
would want to devote a signiﬁcant fraction of their investment towards intangible capital. While
expenditures such as research salaries, blueprint and patent creation, and technology development
may not directly enable a ﬁrm to produce a higher quantity of products, they often enable it
to produce products of a higher quality. Indeed, for many ﬁrms, signiﬁcant R&D expenses are
necessary to maintain a competitive market position. This is reﬂected in the empirical ﬁnding
documented in the paper that these high-R&D ﬁrms also charge signiﬁcantly higher price markups
over cost for their products. Furthermore, the returns on these high-R&D ﬁrms can be linked to
consumers' expenditures on luxury goods, which are also typically high-markup products (as studied
by Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004)).
The ﬁnal contribution of the paper is then to integrate this key insight that high R&D is
connected with higher product quality and price markup into a production-based asset pricing
model. The model features heterogeneous ﬁrms that create products of diﬀerent quality levels, with
ﬁrms that produce higher quality products requiring a greater amount of R&D per unit of physical
capital used for production. These ﬁrms oﬀer price and quality combinations to heterogeneous
consumers, who choose the product that maximizes their utility every period. The economy is
subject to total factor productivity shocks which aﬀect the productivity of physical capital and
demand shocks which aﬀect the preferences of consumers. The model parsimoniously captures the
empirical observation that higher-R&D ﬁrms are more exposed to demand ﬂuctuations. This higher
exposure explains their higher returns. The model also matches the size and markup dynamics in
the data.
This paper is related to several strands of the existing literature. First, there have been several
empirical asset pricing studies that focus on how some form of intangible investment aﬀects future
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equity returns. Perhaps the most noted of these is the 2001 paper by Chan, Lakonishok, and
Sougiannis showing that a ﬁrm's ratio of R&D expenditures to market equity is related to its future
abnormal equity return. Li (2011) studies the interaction between measures of R&D expenditures
and ﬁnancial constraints. Several other papers have studied variants on the R&D anomaly by
focusing on ﬁrms that have been successful in past R&D (Cohen et al. (2013)) and innovative
eﬃciency (Hirshleifer et al. (2013). These papers have found interesting results in focusing on
segments of high R&D-intensity ﬁrms that seem to drive the broader set of results. This paper,
however, will take the view that another measure of R&D intensity is more informative altogether.
In particular, the metric in this paper is important for understanding the returns of larger and
more economically important ﬁrms and helps to price the entire cross-section of stock returns, two
signﬁciant deviations from the existing literature. Finally, a recent paper by Kogan et al. (2016)
has argued that patent creation is important for aggregate economic growth, which will be outside
the scope of the analysis considered in this paper.
Second, there have been several structural asset pricing papers which have considered the rela-
tionship between equity returns and intangible investment or capital. Lin (2012) is the closest to
this analysis; he proposes a model in which intangible capital reduces adjustment costs to physical
capital and so drives excess returns of high R&D/Investment ﬁrms. Other similar papers include
Corhay, Kung, and Schmid (2015), who propose a model linking markups, competition, and stock
returns, and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), who link organizational capital and expected stock
returns. This paper will diﬀer from all of those studies by introducing a diﬀerent and largely
novel mechanism of product market competition to drive the cross-sectional implications. It dif-
fers from the ﬁrst two by also focusing on the cross-section of expected risk-adjusted returns. The
R&D/investment measure considered in this paper is also not closely related to the organizational
capital measure of Eisfeldt and Papanikolau (2015). Lastly, several papers have focused on the idea
that R&D expenditures by ﬁrms can drive endogenous growth in the aggregate economy, such as
Kung and Schmid (2015) and Ai, Croce, and Li (2012), but this paper will focus on a diﬀerent
channel and will have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent cross-sectional implications.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the paper, the
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empirical asset pricing results of the paper, and the empirical motivation for the model. Next,
section 3 introduces the model and discusses each component. Section 4 presents the calibration
and results of the model. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Results
2.1 Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
The data from this project come primarily from the CRSP/Compustat Merged dataset on WRDS.
Firm-level accounting data come from Compustat and include balance sheet items (stocks of capital,
assets, and capital structure measures) and income and cash ﬂow statement items (revenue, cost of
goods sold, R&D expenses, and capital expenditures). Due to the often signiﬁcant seasonality of
many of these series, such as investment expenditures and revenues, observations are collected on
an annual basis. The SIC codes 0-999 (agriculture, ﬁshing, hunting), 4900-4999 (utilities), 6000-
6999 (ﬁnancials), 8888 (foreign governments), and 9000-9999 (international/non-operating) were
also eliminated for most of the analyses in this paper. Finally, companies that did not report R&D
expenditures (about half of the ﬁrm-year observations in the sample) were eliminated. The asset
pricing results for these ﬁrms were quantitatively similar to those for ﬁrms that reported zero values
of R&D expenditures.
The key ratio of interest for much of this paper will be the fraction of total investment spent
on R&D expenses. For this purpose, total investment will be deﬁned as the sum of R&D expenses
and capital expenditures. The reporting standard for ﬁrms are set by the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), which deﬁnes R&D expenses as part of the planned search or
critical investigation aimed at discovery of new knowledge...in developing a new product or service or
a new process or technique or part of the translation of research ﬁndings into a plan or design for a
new product or process. R&D is typically diﬀerentiated into product development (developing new
products or services) and process development (developing new techniques or methods to produce
existing oﬀerings) and includes expenses such as research wages, patent development, and software
development, with wages making up up to 50% of total R&D in some industries (Hall and Lerner
(2010)). Capital expenditures, meanwhile, include all costs in purchasing and making ready for use
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property, plant, and equipment additions. These typically include long-lived tangible assets such as
land, buildings, machinery, equipment, ﬁxtures, and others.
Some have also suggested that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and R&D
expenses are cross-reported by ﬁrms, with some ﬁrms reporting as an R&D expense what other ﬁrms
would report as an SG&A expense (see e.g. Peters and Taylor (2016)). To take this consideration
into account, the empirical asset pricing results are also computed using the ratio of the sum of
R&D and SG&A expenses to the sum of R&D expenses, SG&A expenses, and capital expenditures.
The results are quantitatively similar. Of the ﬁrm-year observations for which R&D expenditures
are reported, 17% of those observations have reported values of 0 R&D expenses. Of the remaining
83%, the distribution is fairly uniform, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Another deﬁnition employed by the paper is a metric of markups, which is used for one result in
Section 2.4. While there are many measures of aggregate markups that have been used in similar
papers and in the industrial organization literature, in order to get a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of price
markups, this paper simply uses the ratio of Revenues to Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) minus 1. This
gives the percentage markup over the cost of goods that ﬁrms are charging. Others have suggested
including other expenses in COGS, such as SG&A expenses, and these changes do not impact the
results in Section 2.4. Summary statistics of ﬁrms by their level of R&D/Investment are available
in Table 4. Higher R&D/Investment ﬁrms tend to be smaller, less levered, and have fewer tangible
assets. They also tend to charge higher prices relative to product costs and earn higher revenues
relative to physical capital (but not total assets, perhaps a reﬂection of other intangible capital that
is included in their asset base).
The Compustat data was then merged with equity returns from CRSP based on the permanent
permco link between the two. Monthly CRSP returns were collected and are the basis for all of
the asset pricing results to follow. From French's website, the monthly excess returns of the market,
HML, SMB, RMW, and CMA factors were obtained. Finally, the data series on luxury good sales
used by Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004) was also obtained from Yogo's website.
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2.2 Alpha Sorts
This section is devoted to the analysis of the question of whether the higher returns associated with
more R&D-intensive ﬁrms are compensation for a recognized risk factor. To analyze this, this paper
starts by analyzing the returns of R&D-intensive ﬁrms relative to the benchmark model for excess
return used in the vast majority of the empirical asset pricing literature, the Fama-French 3-factor
model. This model says that excess returns on a given security should be given by equation (1):
reit = αi + β
rmrf
it RMRFt + β
hml
it HMLt + β
smb
it SMBt + it (1)
where reit represents the return on stock i at time t in excess of the risk free rate. If the model
holds, then the average α over the cross-section of stocks (or for any portfolio of stocks) should
be zero, and the only factors aﬀecting excess returns should be exposures to the excess return on
the value-weighted market factor RMRF , the high minus low book equity to market equity factor
(value minus growth) HML, and the small minus big market cap factor SMB (Fama and French
(1992)).
To test this model, ﬁrms are sorted into eleven portfolios based on their R&D/Investment ratio.
One portfolio contains the ﬁrms which report 0 R&D values, while the remaining ten represent the
ﬁrms which fall into each decile of the R&D/Investment distribution. As Figure 5 illustrates, the
approximately uniform distribution of the R&D/Investment measure means that the unit support
of R&D/Investment will be fairly evenly divided among these deciles. The portfolios are rebalanced
every year with new accounting data, which means that ﬁrms will move across deciles as their
level of R&D/Investment changes every year. Table 5 gives the transition matrix from one year to
the next for the R&D/Investment deciles. The persistence of this measure is signiﬁcantly higher
than those for commonly cited asset pricing anomalies, such as the book-to-market, proﬁtability,
investment, and momentum factors, as evidenced by Opp and van Binsbergen (2016).
The value-weighted returns of the ﬁrms in the portfolio form the time series of returns for each
portfolio. To test the Fama-French 3-factor model, the time series of returns for each portfolio is
regressed on the time series of returns for the market excess return and the HML and SMB factors.
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If the Fama-French 3-factor model correctly prices these assets, then the average excess returns of
these portfolio should be explained by their exposures to these three factors and there should be no
signiﬁcant intercept term in the regression results. Table 1 presents the results for the intercept and
coeﬃcient terms for each portfolio. The columns of the table represent the various portfolios, from
0 (the portfolio of ﬁrms that report R&D values of 0) to the deciles of R&D/Investment (1-10), to
10-1, which represents the zero-cost portfolio of buying portfolio 10 and short-selling portfolio 1
(similar results hold if one short-sells portfolio 0). Examining the ﬁrst two rows, which report the
intercept (α) regression results and their Newey-West t-statistics, one sees that the pricing errors
increase in the R&D/Investment decile, becoming positive and signiﬁcant for deciles 6, 7, 8, 10 and
the long-short 10-1 portfolio. This implies that if one buys portfolio 10 and short-sells portfolio 1,
he earns a monthly return of 58bps (7.2% annualized) in excess of what the Fama-French 3-factor
model would predict based on this portfolio's exposures to the three Fama-French factors. This α
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and thus indicates a violation of the model.
R&D/Investment Decile
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
α
-0.026 -0.057 0.028 0.065 -0.026 0.094 0.219 0.301 0.470 0.099 0.523 0.580
(-0.36) (-0.61) (0.32) (0.75) (-0.30) (1.01) (2.33) (2.63) (3.34) (0.61) (2.90) (2.78)
RMRF 0.909 0.890 1.064 1.046 1.037 1.015 0.950 1.023 1.036 1.025 1.095 0.206
HML 0.130 0.155 0.153 -0.036 -0.139 -0.299 -0.354 -0.450 -0.602 -0.830 -0.794 -0.950
SMB -0.142 -0.226 -0.158 0.078 0.004 0.035 0.022 0.137 0.238 0.592 0.848 1.074
Table 1: R&D/Investment Decile Portfolio Regressions on Fama-French 3 Factors.
First row gives Fama-French 3-Factor alphas, with Newey-West t-statistics below. Bottom 3 rows
give portfolio betas with respect to Fama-French 3 factors.
The bottom three rows also reveal information about the risks of the ﬁrms in these portfolios.
Exposure to the aggregate market risk factor, RMRF, is roughly constant across deciles, indicating
that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the exposures of the high-R&D versus the low-R&D
ﬁrms to the risks spanned by the aggregate stock market. This is an interesting result in itself as it
suggests that the connection between R&D-intensive ﬁrms and high-beta ﬁrms is not as close as some
have suggested, which may be due to the focus on just the composition of investment (rather than
the composition and amount of investment which some measures combine). There are, however,
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signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the exposures of these ﬁrms to HML and SMB. High R&D/Investment
ﬁrms tend to load far more negatively on HML than do low R&D/Investment ﬁrms. This pattern
indicates that these ﬁrms have lower ratios of book equity to market equity and are more growth
ﬁrms than value ﬁrms, consistent with what one might expect. Similarly, high R&D/Investment
ﬁrms load more positively on SMB than do low R&D/Investment ﬁrms, indicating that these ﬁrms
tend to be smaller. Still, after accounting for these exposures (which have somewhat oﬀsetting
eﬀects due to their opposite signs), the Fama-French 3-factor model fails to fully explain the higher
returns of the high R&D/Investment ﬁrms.
In response to the documented failures of the Fama-French 3-factor model to explain certain
anomalies related to investment and proﬁtability (see e.g. Hou et al. (2015) and Novy-Marx
(2013)), Fama and French updated their model to include two additional factors designed to capture
the variation in expected returns associated with ﬁrms' investment policies and proﬁtability. The
updated model is expressed in equation (2):
reit = αi + β
rmrf
it RMRFt + β
hml
it HMLt + β
smb
it SMBt + β
rmw
it RMW t + β
cma
it CMAt + it (2)
where the ﬁrst four terms on the right hand side are identical to the previous model and the
excess return now includes compensation for the return's exposure to RMW , which represents
robust operating proﬁtability minus weak and CMA, which represents conservative investment
minus aggressive. Note that operating proﬁtability is computed as Revenues−COGS−Interest−SG&ABook Equity
and so does not explicitly include either R&D expenses or capital expenditures. Similarly, Fama and
French deﬁne investment as the growth of total assets in the previous year divided by the amount
of assets two years past, so neither measure is mechanically linked to the R&D/Investment measure
in this paper (Fama and French (2015)).
Given that these revisions explicitly seek to address investment-based anomalies, it is natural to
ask whether the R&D/Investment factor which targets the composition of investment can still be
used to generate portfolios which earn abnormal returns under the Fama-French 5-factor model. One
can perform the same test as before: run a time series regression of the value-weighted returns of each
R&D/Investment portfolio on the ﬁve Fama-French factors and report the intercept and coeﬃcient
10
values for each portfolio, checking to see whether the portfolios generate positive intercepts. Table
2 gives those results.
Beginning again with the regression intercepts, an even more striking pattern is apparent. Not
only are the α values still increasing in the R&D/Investment deciles, but the magnitudes are now sig-
niﬁcantly higher. Whereas the long high R&D/Investment and short low R&D/Investment portfolio
earned risk-adjusted monthly excess returns of 58bps per month under the Fama-French 3-factor,
it now earns risk-adjusted excess returns of 82bps per month, or over 10% per year, relative to the
Fama-French 5-factor model. One can see why this is the case by examining the factor exposures
of this portfolio. The ﬁrst three coeﬃcients follow similar patterns to their counterparts in the
Fama-French 3-factor results. Namely, exposures do the market do not seem to have a signiﬁcant
pattern as R&D/Investment varies but high R&D/Investment ﬁrms seem to be more growth ﬁrms
(negatively exposed to HML) and smaller ﬁrms (positively exposed to SMB).
What is diﬀerent is that these ﬁrms are also fairly negatively exposed to the proﬁtability fac-
tor, RMW. This result is somewhat consistent with the observation that these ﬁrms also tend
to have lower Revenue/Asset ratios and lower Asset/Book Equity ratios. Interestingly, the high-
R&D/Investment ﬁrms and low R&D/Investment ﬁrms have very similar exposures to the invest-
ment factor. This latter observation suggests that the decomposition between the amount of invest-
ment and the composition of investment is an important one. Combined, the exposures to RMW
and CMA lower the benchmark for the returns of these high R&D/Investment portfolios under the
Fama-French 5-factor model and thus lead to the more signiﬁcant intercept term.
Tables 21-23 demonstrate that this measure is also robust to other ﬁrm-level characteristics.
Higher R&D/Investment is positively associated with higher risk-adjusted equity returns after con-
trolling for both gross and net proﬁtability. Within proﬁtability quintiles, ﬁrms which do more
R&D relative to total investment earn signiﬁcantly higher Fama-French 3-factor and 5-factor al-
phas. Similarly, double-sorting ﬁrst by the amount of investment (relative to total assets) that a
ﬁrm spends and then by R&D/Investment still produces increasing alphas in the R&D/Investment
ratio. This eﬀect is present for all but the ﬁrms which invest the least (those in the bottom 20%
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R&D/Investment Deciles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
α
-0.077 -0.054 -0.015 0.085 0.023 0.206 0.240 0.361 0.769 0.325 0.768 0.821
(-1.01) (-0.53) (-0.16) (0.90) (0.27) (2.17) (2.35) (3.06) (5.39) (2.00) (4.32) (3.18)
RMRF 0.929 0.900 1.076 1.035 1.028 0.997 0.946 1.005 0.959 0.993 1.070 0.169
HML 0.066 0.091 0.106 0.003 -0.076 -0.287 -0.403 -0.423 -0.410 -0.875 -0.860 -0.951
SMB -0.130 -0.254 -0.136 0.077 -0.007 -0.035 0.001 0.093 0.106 0.406 0.632 0.887
RMW 0.044 -0.109 0.103 0.010 -0.075 -0.252 -0.056 -0.179 -0.523 -0.706 -0.868 -0.758
CMA 0.152 0.146 0.107 -0.075 -0.125 -0.050 0.092 -0.091 -0.476 0.017 0.095 -0.050
Table 2: R&D/Investment Decile Portfolio Regressions on Fama-French 5 Factors
First row gives Fama-French 5-Factor alphas, with Newey-West t-statistics below. Bottom 5
rows give portfolio betas with respect to Fama-French 5 factors.
of the Investment/Assets ratio.) These results are also robust to other factor-based models for
equity returns. Table 24 demonstrates that this eﬀect is ampliﬁed when the Quality-minus-Junk
factor proposed by Asness et al. (2013) is included as a risk factor. Similarly, Table 25 presents the
robustness of these results to the inclusion of a momentum factor.
There are several important diﬀerences between these results and those of earlier papers. First,
portfolio returns are value-weighted rather than the equal-weighted returns found in the literature.
Value-weighting these returns is important for several reasons. First, value-weighting portfolio
returns both prevents big price changes to small market cap ﬁrms from having an outsized impact
on portfolio returns. Thus value-weighting focuses on the larger and more central ﬁrms and is
thus more meaningful from an economic standpoint. Table 15 shows this explicitly by double-
sorting ﬁrms into groups based on assets and then R&D measures. For the R&D/Investment metric
employed in this paper, there is a signiﬁcant return diﬀerential attributable to R&D-intensive ﬁrms
across all size quintiles. In comparison, for the R&D/Market Equity measure, the eﬀect is only
signiﬁcant at a 5% level or stronger for the smallest quintile of ﬁrms, whose median asset values are
0.25% of those of ﬁrms in the highest quintile. This pattern is similar for most other existing R&D
measures in the literature.
Second, value-weighting is more in keeping with the asset allocation of one who would hold this
portfolio. Equal-weighting requires constant rebalancing of a portfolio and very high associated
transactions costs. It is diﬃcult to interpret the returns from such a portfolio as an asset pricing
anomaly if the costs of exploiting the strategy outweigh the potential beneﬁts. Thus it is important
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to value-weight the returns within a portfolio. It is even more important when one considers
that the signiﬁcant asset pricing results that one obtains using equal-weighted portfolio returns
with existing asset pricing measures disappear under value-weighting of portfolio returns, as shown
in Table 6. Thus, the equal-weighted results arbitrarily overemphasize the importance of small
market cap ﬁrms and may not truly represent an anomaly. By showing that the results in this
paper hold for value-weighted (as well as equal-weighted in Table 7) these concerns are eliminated.
Another important diﬀerence the measures of R&D intensity are fairly diﬀerent. Tables 16-20 report
the similarities between the measure introduced in this paper and ﬁve other common measures:
R&D/Market Equity, R&D/Sales, R&D Capital/Market Equity, R&D/R&D Capital, and SG&A
Capital/Assets. The percentage of ﬁrms which fall in the same decile when sorted by the measure
in this paper as when sorted by these measures is fairly low. This is also evidenced by the fact that
the measures themselves are not highly correlated: the highest Pearson or rank correlation between
the measure in this paper and any of the existing measures is 0.4. These low correlations reﬂect an
important economic insight captured by the R&D/Investment measure: its focus on the composition
of investment. While other measures combine the composition of investment and the amount of
investment, the focus on what type of investment a ﬁrm is doing, rather than how much it is doing,
is an important diﬀerentiating factor of this measure. Finally, this measure is the ﬁrst R&D-based
measure to be signiﬁcantly priced in the full cross-section. This is important as it means that the
empirical asset pricing results in this paper are important for understanding the entire cross-section
of equity returns.
The Fama-French 3-factor results and 5-factor results clearly indicate that high R&D/Investment
portfolios earn signiﬁcant positive risk-adjusted returns. These ﬁrms tend to be smaller, more
growth ﬁrms, and less proﬁtable by the Fama-French metric but to load similarly on the aggregate
market factor and the investment factor as their low R&D/Investment counterparts. Despite these
diﬀerential loadings, the higher returns of the high R&D/Investment portfolios are not rationalizable
by any of the Fama-French factors.
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2.3 Fama-MacBeth Results
In any rational asset pricing model, these higher returns must be attributable to some additional
source of risk faced by these high R&D/Investment ﬁrms and aﬀecting investors' discount rates.
A natural follow-up question would then be to ask whether the risk encapsulated in these high
R&D/Investment ﬁrms is important only for them or for a broader number of ﬁrms. This risk
is captured by the return of the portfolio going long high R&D/Investment ﬁrms and short low
R&D/Investment ﬁrms, so, to answer this question, this section presents the cross-sectional asset
pricing results using this 10-1 portfolio as a factor.
A Fama-Macbeth procedure tests whether this innovation risk factor measure is priced for a
larger cross-section of assets. For this analysis, both industry portfolios and the entire dataset of
monthly stock returns (not just those of stocks who report R&D values). For the industry portfolio
results, the largest cross-section of industries categorized by Fama and French is used for the longest
timespan for which all data is available. This results in 49 industries over a period of 559 months.
The Fama-Macbeth procedure is computed as follows. First, for each industry/stock at each point in
time, rolling-window betas with respect to the High R&D/Investment minus Low R&D/Investment
(henceforth referred to as the innovation factor or R&D) and either the Fama-French 3-factor model
or the Fama-French 5-factor model. To account for possible covariances between the factors, these
betas are estimated simultaneously in two groups: one group with the innovation factor and the
Fama-French 3 factors and one group with the innovation factor and the Fama-French 5 factors,
given by equations (1) and (2), respectively. After that, at each point in time, a cross-sectional
regression of excess returns on betas is computed (again, separate regressions for the 3 factors and
R&D from the 5 factors and R&D), and the prices of risk extracted as the λ values in speciﬁcations
(3) and (4):
reit = αi + β
rmrf
it λ
rmrf
t + β
hml
it λ
hml
t + β
smb
it λ
smb
t + β
R&D
it λ
R&D
t + it (3)
reit = αi + β
rmrf
it λ
rmrf
t + β
hml
it λ
hml
t + β
smb
it λ
smb
t + β
rmw
it λ
rmw
t + β
cma
it λ
cma
t + β
R&D
it λ
R&D
t + it (4)
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The choice of test assets (whether industries or individual stocks) represents a trade-oﬀ between
accuracy of beta estimation and use of a larger cross-section. While the use of portfolios mitigates
the errors-in-variables problem associated with estimating time-varying betas for individual stocks
and using those estimated betas in a second-stage estimation, the construction and number of the
portfolios need to be carefully considered. Industry portfolios are utilized here so that the potential
issue of sorting portfolios by characteristics is avoided. Moreover, the broadest set of industries
reported is used to obtain as large a cross-section (and hence as powerful a test as possible.) The
procedure is also replicated with individual stocks and the results are displayed in Table 9 in the
appendix.
Table 3 presents the Fama-Macbeth results for the Fama-French 3-factors and the innovation
factor, using the 49 industry portfolios as deﬁned on French's website. Both equally-weighted
and value-weighted portfolio returns are considered (with the factor weighting matching the return
weighting); the results are robust to choice of portfolio and factor weighting. Across the speciﬁca-
tions, both the market factor and the innovation factor both have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
Thus, exposure to the market and innovation risk factors are associated with signiﬁcantly higher
expected returns. In particular, an increase by one in market beta is associated with an increased
monthly industry return of 42-59 bps, and an increase by one in innovation beta is associated with
an increased monthly industry return of 86-89 bps. Moreover, SMB is not signiﬁcant in either spec-
iﬁcation and HML is only signiﬁcant in one of the speciﬁcations. Thus, these results suggest that
both innovation risk and market risk have signiﬁcant pricing power for the cross section of industry
returns.
These results are robust to other speciﬁcations. Table 8 in the appendix presents the industry
Fama-Macbeth results for the innovation factor and Fama-French 5 factors. In those tests, the
market risk factor is the most signiﬁcant, followed by the innovation risk factor (which is signiﬁcant
for equally-weighted portfolio returns but less so for value-weighted portfolio returns). None of the
other factors are signiﬁcant in either test. Table 9 in the appendix presents the Fama-Macbeth
results for value-weighted individual stock returns. With respect to the three-factor model, the
innovation factor is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and has a t-statistic fairly similar in magnitude to
that of two other factors, the excess market return and SMB. HML, however, is no longer signiﬁcant
with either speciﬁcation. More formally, the test of whether HML is spanned by the RMRF, SMB,
and innovation factors produces no signiﬁcant intercept for HML and thus indicates that it is
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λ Values
High− Low
RD
Inv
0.888* 0.856**
(1.83) (2.35)
Mkt− rf 0.591*** 0.425*
(2.89) (1.77)
HML
0.156 0.408**
(0.97) (2.15)
SMB
0.078 0.249
(0.48) (1.27)
Weights Value Equal
Table 3: Fama-Macbeth Industry Results for Fama-French 3 Factors and Innovation Factor
This table reports the Fama-Macbeth prices of risk from the two-stage Fama-Macbeth regression
presented in the paper for value- and equal-weighted industry returns. Values reported as percent-
age points per month. First, for each industry at each point in time, 72-month rolling-window betas
with respect to the innovation factor and simultaneously the Fama-French 3-factor model. After
that, at each point in time, a cross-sectional regression of excess returns on betas is computed, and
the prices of risk extracted as the λ values in speciﬁcation (3). Speciﬁcally, each estimate reported
is an estimate of a lambda value based on a time-series average of the lambdas estimated for each
cross-sectional second-stage regression. Results robust to value vs. equal weighting of factors and
diﬀerent horizons for rolling window estimation. *** indicates signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** indi-
cates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation over time.
spanned by the other three. In contrast, the innovation factor is not spanned by the three traditional
Fama-French factors. For the ﬁve factor results, the innovation factor is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The same patterns from the 3-factor model are still apparent, namely that RMRF and SMB are
signiﬁcant but HML is not. Additionally, CMA is no longer signiﬁcant (again indicating that this
contrast between the composition of investment and the intensity of investment is important) and
RMW has a negative price of risk.
Across all of these speciﬁcations, the key result is the consistent signiﬁcance of the innovation
factor, which indicates that the risk spanned by this factor is important for the entire cross-section
of excess industry and stock returns, and that it is not spanned by the other factors in the Fama-
French models. Second, adding the innovation factor seems to eliminate the explanatory power of
HML for the cross-section of equity returns.
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2.4 Evidence on Markups and Luxury Goods
The previous sections have clearly documented that high R&D/Investment ﬁrms earn not only
higher equity returns, but also higher returns after accounting for the most common equity return
factor model predictions. Rational asset pricing models imply that this must be a compensation for
some form of risk which matters to investors, and the Fama-MacBeth results indicate that this risk
matters not only for the returns of high R&D/Investment ﬁrms, but also for the entire cross-section
of equity returns. Having documented this return pattern and the importance of the risk factor
spanned by these high R&D/Investment ﬁrms, the goal is now to try to understand this risk factor
and to link it to underlying economic quantities.
For this task it is helpful to think about why these ﬁrms do so much R&D relative to other
forms of investment. Numerous theories for this have been advanced, but one that has received
general acceptance is that R&D acts as a way for ﬁrms to maintain their competitive advantages.
In particular, for ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated products and rely on being able to charge pre-
miums for those products, one important way to maintain their diﬀerentiation and the willingness
of consumers to pay premia is to continue to innovate. Indeed, the summary statistics conﬁrm that
ﬁrms which do more R&D relative to total investment charge higher price markups relative to cost
(have a higher Revenue/Cost of Goods Sold ratio.) The results in Table 10 provide further stronger
evidence on this pointthe regression results of future markup on the ratio of R&D/Investment,
ﬁrm size, and controls for industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects indicate a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of
R&D/Investment on future ﬁrm markups. This evidence is also consistent with ﬁrm-level evidence
by Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2013), who ﬁnd that product innovations increase ﬁrm markups
by an average of 5.1% and process innovations increase ﬁrm markups by 3.8% on average.
But why are higher markups in themselves more risky and why is this risk important to investors?
One clue comes in the relation between the returns to the long-short R&D/Investment portfolio and
the luxury sales index compiled by Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004). Table 11 shows that the growth in
luxury good sales helps to explain the risk premium associated with this long-short portfolio, which
indicates that the risk implied by the sale of luxury goods, another high markup item, is similar
to that spanned by the R&D/Investment factor. In particular, the luxury consumption risk that
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Ait-Sahalia and his coauthors identify seems to be linked to the risk of these high R&D/Investment
ﬁrms. One can think of this more broadly as demand risks that aﬀect all ﬁrms, but particularly ﬁrms
which rely on being able to charge high markups, as both their prices and quantities are potentially
more prone to shifts in consumer preferences. The next section builds on this key insight and
introduces a model which formalizes this intuition.
3 Model Setup
The model features a number of diﬀerent elements which will be described in this section. Its most
novel feature is the integration of product market competition into a production-based asset pricing
framework, as will be described later. The model is inﬁnite horizon and discrete time and contains
heterogeneous consumers, heterogeneous ﬁrms, and two state variables. The consumers, ﬁrms, and
environment are described in the following subsections.
3.1 Consumers
Consumers in this model are the source of demand for the ﬁrms. Each period, a unit mass of
consumers enters the market for a good and views the menu of options oﬀered by ﬁrms. An option
oﬀered by a ﬁrm consists of a quality level of product and corresponding price, as will be discussed in
greater detail later. For now, it suﬃces to say that quality is a feature which vertically diﬀerentiates
productsthat is, all consumers prefer a higher quality product, all else equal. Each consumer
evaluates the menu of oﬀerings and chooses the product that maximizes his utility. The consumer
may choose to buy either one unit of one product or not to buy at all. What diﬀerentiates consumers
is their willingness to pay for an increase in a product's quality.
Formally, the willingness of consumer j to pay for a higher quality product is represented by
the parameter θj . The quality of products is indexed by s and the indirect utility that a consumer
with preference parameter θj maximizes every period is given by:
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Uj =
{
u0 + θ
s
j − p if purchase good of type s at price p
0 else
}
That is, consumers get some base utility from purchasing a product of any quality level u0, then
some utility which depends on both their preference for quality and the quality of the good they
purchase. Finally, they internalize the price of the good which they purchase. This framework is
a fairly standard one for vertically diﬀerentiated goods, see e.g. Tirole (1988). The consumers are
price takers and so have no ability to impact prices; their decisions are independent of the decisions
of the other consumers. Therefore the consumer's problem can be expressed as:
max
si
{u0 + θsi − p (si) , 0} (5)
The parameter θ is the only diﬀerentiating factor among consumers and thus what drives any
diﬀerences in their decisions. In wanting to tie the distribution of θ to empirical counterparts, several
options were considered. Existing evidence suggests that factors which derive heterogeneity across
households include income, age, wealth, and other sources, but, for the purposes of this model,
perhaps income is the most salient. The distribution of income has been extensively studied and
researchers have suggested a number of diﬀerent distributions to match the cross-sectional patterns
of income, including the exponential distribution, the lognormal distribution, and the generalized
Pareto distribution. Among these, the exponential is chosen in this paper because of its property
as a distribution governed by one parameter. Given that there is no precise data counterpart to the
preference parameter, the goal is to calibrate as close to the data as possible, and having relatively
fewer parameters for the distribution of preferences helps achieve that goal. The results, however,
are robust to the other distributions with similar properties.
The dynamics of the θ distribution vary over time in the model with one of the model's two
state variables, Xt. This state variable can be interpreted as a demand or preference shock and it
is set equal to the mean (or the inverse of the scale parameter) of the exponential distribution of θ.
That is, higher values of Xt imply a distribution which skews more towards greater willingness to
pay for quality, while lower values imply a distribution which skews more towards lower willingness
19
to pay for quality, as illustrated in Figure 6. The log of Xt will follow an AR(1) process, given by
equation (6).
xt+1 = (1− ρx) x¯+ ρxxt + σxxt+1 (6)
where xt+1 is a standard normal random variable. The parameters for this process can be directly
tied down by the aggregate markups in the model economy, as will be discussed in the calibration
section.
3.2 Firms and Good Quality
The other type of agent in the economy is a ﬁrm. Firms will produce the goods and will face
constraints on their production from both consumer demand and the supply and productivity of
capital. Firms will maintain two types of capitalintangible and physicalwhich will aﬀect their
proﬁts and values diﬀerentially. Finally, ﬁrms will be heterogeneous, with a suﬃcient statistic for
ﬁrm heterogeneity being the quality level of products that they produce. Firms will choose both
their quality level and the price which they set for their goods, and this will determine their capital
needs and proﬁt.
At any given point in time, ﬁrms maintain two stocks of capital. One is physical capital Kt,
which is required for production. Production follows a standard AK-technology, where total output
Yt can be represented as Yt = AtKt and At represents the state of capital productivity in the
economy. At is the second state variable in this model and again its log follows an AR(1) process,
displayed in equation (7).
at+1 = (1− ρa) a¯+ ρaat + σaat+1 (7)
where at+1 is a standard normal random variable uncorrelated with 
x
t+1. Firms also maintain levels
of intangible capital IKt. Unlike physical capital, intangible capital is not used directly in the
production process. Rather, it helps to diﬀerentiate products. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms that maintain
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higher levels of intangible capital relative to their total capital produce higher quality products. For
a ﬁrm i with capital levels Kit and IKit, the quality of goods that it produces is sit =
IKit
IKit+Kit
.
The intuition for this feature is as follows: physical capital is needed for the actual production of
products, but intangible capital helps to diﬀerentiate goods. The more intangible capital, in the
form of research, thought, innovation, testing, process development, etc. that goes into the product,
the higher the quality that the product will be and the more that consumers will be willing to pay
for it. This will also help match the empirical ﬁnding that ﬁrms that do more R&D/Investment
charge higher markups over cost for their products. One could akternatively envision N production
functions for goods of diﬀerent qualities requiring certain ratios of physical and intangible capital.
Such a setting would be isomorphic to this one, and the ﬂexibility of the setup allows for a wide
range of interpretation of R&D expenses.
There are a ﬁnite number of quality levels s1, s2, . . . sN at which a product can produced, evenly
spaced throughout the unit interval that deﬁnes the quality spectrum. The economy features N
ﬁrms; at time 0, ﬁrm i is born into quality level si. That is, at time 0, there is exactly one ﬁrm
per quality level. As long as this continues to be the case, this single ﬁrm acts a monopolist in the
market for goods of that speciﬁc quality level. Of course, the prices that such a ﬁrm can set will be
constrained by the prices set by other ﬁrms, but this ﬁrm can earn positive proﬁts. If multiple ﬁrms
are producing the same quality product, however, these ﬁrms will engage in Bertrand competition
and their proﬁts will both be 0. While there is no ﬁrm entry, ﬁrms are able to endogenously choose
their quality level and switch into any of the N good quality markets. As Proposition 1 states (and
Appendix B proves), as long as there is some positive switching cost c, this will never happen in
the Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium.1
Proposition 1. If there is a positive cost of switching quality levels, no ﬁrm will ever switch from
its initial quality level in the Pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibrium.
1This result is similar to that in Chapter 3 of Grossman and Helpman: Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy.
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Firms rent their physical and intangible capital at rental rates rK and rIK respectively. One
could view this as resulting from the inelastic supply of these two inputs from an unmodeled section
of the economy. One could also alternatively think of ﬁrms owning their capital and being able to
freely adjust it intro-period after observing the aggregate state variables. In that case the costs of
capital would be the diﬀerence between the price paid today and the discounted depreciated amount
for which it can be sold in the following period and so would be stochastic. The quantitative results
of the model, however, do not change under this formulation.
3.3 Final Goods Market and Firm Problem
Figure 3 illustrates the interactions of consumers and ﬁrms in the market for ﬁnal goods.
Every period, each ﬁrm (representing one of the N diﬀerent quality levels) decides on a price to
set for its product after observing the realizations of the two state variables. Based on that price
and the prices and qualities set by all of the other ﬁrms, consumers will choose the product oﬀering
which maximizes their utility. The aggregation of consumers who choose a particular product will
determine the quantity demanded for that product. In equilibrium, ﬁrms will know this quantity,
and so will rent the exact amount of physical and intangible required to product that many units
of their quality level.
Figure 3: Interaction of Consumers and Firms in Product Market
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Each ﬁrm will set its price taking into account its own quality level and those of other ﬁrms, as
well as its beliefs about the prices that the other ﬁrms set (which will be correct in equilibrium).
It will account for the two aggregate states in the economy, At and Xt, and the decision-making
problem of the consumers. Since capital is adjustable each period, ﬁrms will incorporate the cost
of capital into their pricing decision, and, by choosing the price they set (and thus the quantity
they will sell), they also choose their optimal capital levels. As a result, the solution methodology
does not require tracking the capital distribution of ﬁrms over time. The ﬁrm's problem can thus
be written as maximizing proﬁt given in equation (8) subject to the demand constraint in equation
(9).
piit (At, Lt, si) = max
Pit,si
PitAtKit − rKKit −
rIKsiKit
(1− si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
rIKIKit
− c1{switch}
 (8)
s.t. AtKit =
ˆ
1{argmax(Uj)=si}f (j) dj (9)
where the latter conditions enforces that ﬁrms produce exactly enough to meet the quantity de-
manded. (One could also make this last equality a weak inequality and have ﬁrms maximize over
their capital stocks, but it is clear that no ﬁrm would want to rent more capital than required to
meet its demand.)
3.4 Firm Value
Firms are entirely equity ﬁnanced and earn proﬁts that are weakly greater than 0 every period. As
a result, the value of a ﬁrm is simply its discounted dividend stream, where the dividends are equal
to the proﬁts earned by a ﬁrm in a given period. Firm value Vt can be expressed as:
Vit (At, Xt, si) = piit + Et [Mt+1Vit+1] (10)
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where Mt+1 represents the stochastic discount factor in the economy. This discount factor has
exposures to both shocks At and Xt, as well as time-varying prices of risks for both shocks. Mt+1
is thus given by equations (11) - (13).
log (Mt+1) = log(β) + γat (at − at+1) + γxt (xt − xt+1) (11)
γat = γa0 + γa1 (at − a¯) (12)
γxt = γx0 + γx1 (xt − x¯) (13)
4 Model Calibration and Results
4.1 Model Calibration
Despite the novel product market dynamics in the model, the number of parameters to calibrate
is quite limited. The model contains 13 parameters and is calibrated on a monthly basis. The
parameters can be grouped into four categories: the SDF parameters β, γa0, γa1, γx0, and γx1, the
rental rates rK and rIK , and the parameters governing the productivity shock a¯, σa, and ρa and
those governing the preference shock x¯, σx, and ρx.
Two groups of these parameters can be estimated directly from the data. First, the rental rates
are tied to the rates of depreciation on the two forms of capital, as discussed in Section 3. Thus,
these monthly parameters can be tied to the annual depreciation rates of physical and intangible
capital found in Lin (2012). Lin ﬁnds the rate of depreciation on tangible capital to be 0.1 and the
rate of depreciation on intangible capital to be 0.2. Given that these rental rates also reﬂect some
cost of discounting, the monthly rental rates for tangible and intangible capital are set at 0.01 and
0.02, respectively. Second, the parameters governing the productivity shock are standard in much
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of this literature and have been estimated and used by a number of papers. This paper follows the
calibration in Zhang (2005) for the monthly AR(1) process governing productivity shocks.
This leaves two sets of parameters which have to be calibrated. The ﬁrst is the set of three
parameters governing the demand shock process. Given the diﬃculty of observing this process
directly in the data, the challenge is to ﬁnd a readily observable empirical series to which the
demand shock can be closely linked. In this model, given the previous two sets of parameters, the
demand shock determines the markups set by each ﬁrm. Thus, one can directly link the demand
shock to the aggregate markup that this model produces. Fortunately, Kung, Schmid, and Corhay
(2015) have estimated an AR(1) process for the aggregate price markup series, and so this paper
calibrates the demand shock process to most closely match the parameters that they estimate. The
values for the parameters in the paper can be found in Table 12 and the resulting values for the
aggregate markup process in Table 13.
The last set of parameters is the one governing the SDF. There are ﬁve parameters in the SDF,
and thus one needs at least ﬁve data counterparts with which to identify these parameters. This
paper follows the lead of Zhang (2005) in taking three of these data counterparts to be the mean
and volatility of the risk-free rate and the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. The remaining
two parameters are used to target the returns to low R&D/Investment ﬁrms and the returns to
high R&D/Investment ﬁrms. All of the estimated parameters can be found in Table 12, while the
risk-free rate and market return moments can be found in Table 13. The returns to high and low
R&D/Investment ﬁrms will be discussed in the next section.
4.2 Model Results
The most novel feature of the model is the product market dynamic and thus it makes sense to start
there. While the eﬀects of the productivity shock are fairly standard, the eﬀects of the consumer
preference shock are perhaps not so readily understood. One way to understand the eﬀects of these
shocks is to look at their impacts on the decisions which consumers make. Figure 4 illustrates the
eﬀect of a shock to preference on consumer decisions.
The graph on the left represents the distribution of consumers under the median state of con-
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sumer preference, while the graph on the right represents the distribution of consumers following a
positive preference shock. The x-axis displays the θ parameter of consumers while the y-axis gives
the density (which integrates to 1 in both cases.) Ignoring the colors, one notices that the distribu-
tion shifts towards higher θ values following a positive preference shock. What is more interesting is
the eﬀect that this has on the product choice of consumers. The colors on the graph represent the
product choices that consumers make, going from red (lowest quality) to magenta (highest quality).
One sees that consumers shift signiﬁcantly towards higher quality products following a positive
preference shock and shift away from products of lower qualities. Figure 7 shows that this example
is consistent with the global behavior of the model: the higher the preference parameter, the lower
the market shares of low-quality products and the higher the market shares of high quality products.
This is in keeping with one's intuition: as consumers' tastes shift more towards higher quality, we
should see the market shares of these companies growing.
Figure 4: Eﬀect of a Shock to Consumer Preferences on Decisions and Quantities
X represents the aggregate demand state of the economy, while theta represents the preference
parameter of a consumer
The other component to the ﬁrm's proﬁts, besides its market share, is its proﬁt margin, or
the amount of proﬁt that it earns for every unit that it sells. Figure 8 plots the proﬁt margins of
low-, medium-, and high-quality ﬁrms as a function of the underlying preference state. Consistent
with empirical evidence (see e.g. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)), markups are fairly insensitive to
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demand shocks. However, the markups of high-quality ﬁrms are more procyclical with respect to
demand shocks than those of low- or medium-quality ﬁrms, whose markups are essentially acyclical.
Combined with the diﬀerential exposures of quantities to demand shocks, this implies that the
proﬁts (cash ﬂows) of high-quality ﬁrms covary much more positively with demand shocks than do
those of low-quality ﬁrms, whose cash ﬂows covary somewhat negatively with demand shocks.
This hetereogeneous exposure to demand shocks is key for the asset pricing implications of the
paper. Firms of all qualities have similar exposures to productivity shocks. This is because a positive
productivity shock reduces the amount of capital required to produce a certain amount of output,
which also reduces the amount of intangible capital required. The former eﬀect is more signiﬁcant
for low-quality ﬁrms and the latter is more signiﬁcant for high-quality ﬁrms, but, on balance, the
total eﬀects are similar. What diﬀerentiates ﬁrms, then, is their exposure to the demand shock.
Since both shocks are priced by investors, the similar loading of all ﬁrms to the productivity shock
will drive a risk factor which is essentially common to all ﬁrms. In a CAPM sense, this will be
the risk factor that the market prices. The covariance with respect to the demand shock will be a
priced risk factor whose quantity of risk diﬀers signiﬁcantly across ﬁrms, and this is what will drive
the heterogeneity in returns. Since the high-quality ﬁrms are more exposed to this shock, they will
earn higher returns in equilibrium.
This result is consistent with the earlier empirical evidence on the reliance of these ﬁrms on
markups and the comovement of their returns with the growth of luxury sales. It is precisely these
quantities that are most directly tied to preference shocks as those shocks most strongly aﬀect
whether consumers purchase high-markup products and are willing to pay high premia for them. It
should thus not be surprising that this risk factor also drives the higher returns of R&D-intensive
ﬁrms that are also dependent on markups.
Table 14 presents the models results on returns and ﬁrm size. The model matches the CAPM
alpha and beta results fairly well. In addition, despite not being calibrated to match ﬁrm sizes,
the product market implications for ﬁrm size match the empirical distribution of ﬁrm size by ratio
of R&D/Investment closely. High R&D/Investment ﬁrms tend to be smaller and to earn higher
CAPM alphas despite their slightly higher CAPM betas. The fact that these ﬁrms are smaller on
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average is important for the model. Since the magnitude of the covariance of these ﬁrms' cash
ﬂows with the demand shock is much higher than the magnitude of the covariance for the lower
R&D/Investment ﬁrms, one needs that these ﬁrms account for less of the market value than the low
R&D/Investment ﬁrms in order for the value-weighted market portfolio to have minimal exposure
to the demand shocks. Finally, the model does not match the Fama-French 3 or 5 factor models
simply because there are not enough shocks in the model to capture asset pricing cross-sectional
heterogeneity on more than two dimensions, but this is an interesting area for future research.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the returns to this innovation at the ﬁrm level by proposing a novel character-
istic that examines the fraction of investment attributed to R&D expenses. This metric is important
for the entire cross-section of ﬁrms, including larger, more economically signiﬁcant ﬁrms. The asset
pricing implications examine how risk and returns vary with the composition of investment chosen
by a ﬁrm.
Relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model, a portfolio which goes long the highest R&D/Investment
ﬁrms and short the lowest R&D/Investment ﬁrms earns monthly excess returns of 58bps per month,
or just over 7% annually. This is after accounting for the fact that these high R&D/Investment
ﬁrms have slightly higher betas and tend to be small, growth ﬁrms. These results are signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, and, in contrast to previous studies on R&D, hold for value-weighted portfolios.
Compared to the Fama-French 5-factor model, the results are even more signiﬁcant: the long-short
portfolio earns risk-adjusted returns of 82bps per month, which corresponds to over 10% per annum.
The main reason for the diﬀerence in the results is that these high-R&D ﬁrms load more negatively
on the Fama-French proﬁtability factor, despite earning higher revenues relative to both costs and
tangible capital. The risk spanned by these high R&D/Investment ﬁrms is not just important for
those ﬁrms, however. In the Fama-MacBeth test, the long-short portfolio has signiﬁcant explanatory
power for the entire cross-section of excess returns and (along with the market and SMB factors)
spans HML such that it is no longer signiﬁcant. Combined, these results indicate very strongly that
high R&D/Investment ﬁrms are earning signiﬁcantly higher returns than those predicted by the
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leading models of expected returns, and that the risk spanned by these ﬁrms is important for the
entire cross-section of equity returns.
In seeking to explain this pattern, this paper focused on the exposure of these ﬁrms to the high
markups which they charge. There is signiﬁcant evidence that high R&D/Investment ﬁrms charge
signiﬁcantly higher markups over cost, even after controlling for industry, size, and year eﬀects.
Moreover, the excess returns of these ﬁrms correlate signiﬁcantly with the sales growth of another
high-markup item, luxury goods. This eﬀect holds even after controlling for the usual Fama-French
factors. Combined, these pieces of evidence suggest that the risk encapsulated by the sales of these
high-markup products is important to understand the higher returns of R&D-intensive ﬁrms.
The ﬁnal contribution of this paper is a model which formalizes this intuition. The model
integrates a standard production-based asset pricing framework with the novel mechanism of product
market interactions between heterogeneous ﬁrms and heterogeneous consumers. In the product
(ﬁnal goods) market, heterogeneous ﬁrms oﬀer vertically diﬀerentiated products to consumers with
diﬀerent levels of willingness to pay for higher quality products. The equilibrium between these
two agents results in the purchase of lower-quality goods by consumers who are less willing to
pay for quality and the purchase of higher-quality goods at higher markups by consumers who are
more willing to pay for quality. The aggregation of consumers choosing a particular ﬁrm's product
determines the quantity that it decides to produce, but this quantity (and the price that the ﬁrm
sets) are subject to both supply shocks in the form of productivity shocks and demand shocks in the
form of changes to the distribution of consumer preferences. While ﬁrms have similar exposures to
supply shocks, the model generates the endogenous result that ﬁrms oﬀering higher-quality products
are more exposed to demand shocks. This risk factor is not spanned by the market risk factor and
thus generates excess returns for these ﬁrms. The model also matches the size distribution of ﬁrms
and the markup dynamics of the economy.
While these targets are certainly ﬁrst-order, one could imagine many other goals for such a
model in capturing the dynamics of more sophisticated return models or matching ﬁrm leverage or
investment timing choices more closely. This product market mechanism seems to be a good ﬁrst
step on the path towards these goals, which are left for future research.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table 4: Summary Statistics
R&D/Investment
0-0.2 0.2-0.4 0.4-0.6 0.6-0.8 0.8-1
Assets ($MM) 4344 2280 2491 1444 448
Leverage (%) 25.3 23.2 20.3 14.8 19.6
PPE/Assets (%) 38.9 28.0 22.0 16.2 10.8
Revenue/Cogs (%) 159.3 169.5 192.0 239.5 246.5
Revenue Growth (%) 21.1 21.1 26.1 33.2 32.9
Revenue/PPE 4.75 6.27 7.73 10.2 16.4
Revenue/Assets 1.19 1.23 1.14 1.02 0.79
Capex/Assets (%) 9.86 7.27 6.02 4.91 2.38
R&D/Assets (%) 0.98 3.15 6.14 12.1 32.9
R&D/Investment (%) 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.92
Note: Table presents mean of each variable by R&D/Investment group. All variables or ratios
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Firm-year observation level.
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Table 5: R&D/Investment Transition Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs Time t+ 1 R&D/Inv Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T
im
e
t
R
&
D
/I
n
v
D
ec
il
e 1 98.1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
2 3.4% 65.4% 25.3% 3.1% 1.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2%
3 1.3% 6.7% 67.0% 17.3% 4.1% 1.7% 0.9% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
4 0.6% 0.7% 17.4% 50.8% 19.4% 6.1% 2.3% 1.5% 0.9% 0.4%
5 0.4% 0.3% 3.7% 21.0% 43.4% 18.1% 7.3% 3.3% 1.7% 0.8%
6 0.3% 0.1% 1.4% 5.7% 20.4% 37.6% 20.4% 8.3% 4.1% 1.8%
7 0.3% 0.1% 0.9% 2.3% 6.9% 21.4% 33.7% 20.8% 9.9% 3.8%
8 0.1% 0.1% 0.5% 1.2% 3.1% 8.7% 22.2% 34.3% 21.6% 8.2%
9 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 1.7% 4.1% 9.3% 22.8% 38.5% 22.1%
10 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 1.7% 3.6% 8.0% 22.3% 62.2%
Note: Annual transition matrix for R&D/Investment deciles. Value in ijth entry represents
the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment decile in year t is in the jth decile in year
t + 1. Firm-year observation level.This measure is signiﬁcantly more persistent than the book-to-
market, proﬁtability, investment, and momentum measures. Numbers in each row sum to 100%
(with possible rounding error).
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Table 6: Equal-Weighted vs. Value-Weighted Results for Other R&D Measures
Equal-weighted:
Alphas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
R&D/Sales
α
-0.094 -0.039 0.075 0.113 0.310 0.297 0.394 0.428 0.282 0.269 0.364*
(-1.05) (-0.48) (0.90) (1.35) (3.17) (2.61) (3.12) (3.10) (1.77) (1.36) (1.81)
R&D Capital/Market Equity
α
-0.436 -0.189 -0.142 -0.013 -0.069 0.170 0.217 0.356 0.712 1.381 1.817***
(-5.08) (-2.78) (-1.93) (-0.18) (-0.82) (1.79) (2.00) (2.67) (4.25) (6.15) (7.89)
R&D/R&D Capital
α
0.455 0.431 0.350 0.251 0.331 0.177 0.108 0.148 -0.217 -0.102 -0.691***
(2.94) (3.46) (3.95) (2.96) (4.12) (1.97) (1.11) (1.10) (-1.73) (-0.55) (-4.08)
Value-weighted:
Alphas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
R&D/Sales
α
-0.010 0.040 -0.040 0.025 0.086 0.084 -0.003 0.413 0.416 0.055 0.154
(-0.92) (0.46) (-0.42) (0.28) (0.98) (0.92) (-0.03) (3.12) (2.53) (0.27) (0.62)
R&D Capital/Market Equity
α
-0.013 0.003 0.160 0.198 0.134 0.095 0.194 0.145 0.087 0.092 0.105
(-0.12) (0.03) (1.94) (2.23) (1.46) (0.95) (1.72) (1.14) (0.63) (0.63) (0.55)
R&D/R&D Capital
α
-0.003 0.178 0.092 0.121 0.023 0.108 0.168 0.052 0.084 -0.001 -0.144
(-0.03) (1.92) (1.21) (1.60) (0.29) (1.06) (1.60) (0.38) (0.57) (-0.01) (-0.61)
Note: Tables present Fama-French 3-factor equal- and value-weighted alphas sorted by deciles
of common R&D measures in the literature. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per month.
In the last column, *** indicates signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These results use the same data sample and portfolio
construction methodology as the R&D/Investment results presented in the paper. Numbers in
parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 7: Equal-Weighted R&D/Investment Results
R&D/Investment Decile
0 1 2 4 6 8 10 10-1
α
-0.130 -0.258 -0.132 0.049 0.266** 0.429*** 0.767*** 1.025***
(-1.17) (-2.84) (-1.59) (0.60) (2.60) (3.19) (3.85) (5.27)
RMRF 0.993 1.090 1.059 1.062 1.066 1.045 1.049 -0.041
HML 0.408 0.333 0.323 0.087 -0.225 -0.333 -0.297 -0.630
SMB 0.895 0.569 0.651 0.746 0.948 1.158 1.557 0.988
Note: Table reports Fama-French 3-factor equal-weighted alphas and betas by deciles of R&D/Investment
measure. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per month. In the top row, *** indicates sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the
10% level. These results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the
value-weighted results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 8: Industry Fama-Macbeth Results for Fama-French 5 Factors and Inno-
vation Factor
λ Values
High− Low
RD
Inv
0.599 0.658*
(1.32) (1.87)
Mkt− rf 0.594*** 0.551**
(2.91) (2.34)
HML
0.126 0.249
(0.79) (1.39)
SMB
0.063 0.242
(0.39) (1.29)
RMW
-0.076 -0.163
(-0.60) (-1.20)
CMA
0.174 0.223
(1.50) (1.66)
Weights Value Equal
Note: This table reports the Fama-Macbeth prices of risk from the two-stage Fama-Macbeth
regression presented in the paper for value- and equal-weighted industry returns. Values reported
as percentage points per month. First, for each industry at each point in time, 72-month rolling-
window betas with respect to the innovation factor and simultaneously the Fama-French 5-factor
model. After that, at each point in time, a cross-sectional regression of excess returns on betas
is computed, and the prices of risk extracted as the λ values in speciﬁcation (4). Speciﬁcally,
each estimate reported is an estimate of a lambda value based on a time-series average of the
lambdas estimated for each cross-sectional second-stage regression. Results robust to value vs. equal
weighting of factors and diﬀerent horizons for rolling window estimation. *** indicates signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation over time.
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Table 9: Individual Stock Fama-Macbeth Results
λ Values
High− Low
RD
Inv
0.474* 0.520**
(1.84) (2.05)
Mkt− rf 0.405** 0.397**
(2.12) (2.08)
HML
0.035 0.047
(0.26) (0.37)
SMB
0.336** 0.327**
(2.43) (2.42)
RMW
-0.193**
(-2.06)
CMA
0.102
(1.15)
Note: This table reports the Fama-Macbeth prices of risk from the two-stage Fama-Macbeth
regression presented in the paper for value-weighted stock returns. Values reported as percentage
points per month. First, for each stock at each point in time, 60-month rolling-window betas with
respect to the innovation factor and simultaneously the Fama-French 3-factor model or the Fama-
French 5-factor model. After that, at each point in time, a cross-sectional regression of excess
returns on betas is computed (again, separate regressions for the 3 factors and R&D from the 5
factors and R&D), and the prices of risk extracted as the λ values in speciﬁcations (3) and (4).
Speciﬁcally, each estimate reported is an estimate of a lambda value based on a time-series average
of the lambdas estimated for each cross-sectional second-stage regression. *** indicates signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation over time.
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Table 10: R&D/Investment and Firm Markup
Markupt+1
RDt
Invt
0.424***
(3.20)
ln(Assetst) 0.048
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Obs. 129,097
Note: Markup is deﬁned as Revenue/Cost of Goods Sold -1. *** indicates signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Numbers reported in parantheses are standard errors clustered at industry level. All variables
or ratios winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Firm-year observation level.
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Table 11: R&D/Investment Returns and Luxury Good Sales
ret1,t ret10,t ret10−1,t
Lt
-0.278 0.664* 0.942**
(-1.48) (1.82) (2.41)
RMRFt 0.860 1.194 0.334
HMLt 0.209 -0.714 -0.923
SMBt -0.102 1.247 1.348
Intercept -0.114 0.491 0.605
Obs. 192 192 192
Overall −R2 75.32 79.64 69.23
Note: Lt measure is real growth in luxury sales from Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004). ret10 represents
the value-weighted return on the ﬁrms in the highest R&D/Investment decile. The coeﬃcient can
be interpreted as follows: a 1 standard deviation increase in luxury good sales is associated with a 66
bps increase in the monthly returns of the high R&D/Investment portfolio and a 28 bps decrease in
the monthly returns of the low R&D/Investment portfolio, after controlling for the exposure of this
portfolio to the Fama-French 3 factors. For Lt, * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Numbers
reported in parantheses are Newey-West standard errors. Firm-year observation level.
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Table 12: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Moment/Target
β -0.006 rf mean
γa0 35 rf std dev
γa1 -700 rM Sharpe
γx0 .5 rHI mean
γx1 -10 rLO mean
rk 0.01 physical cap dep
rik 0.02 intangible cap dep
ρa 0.998
Zhang (2005)µa 0
σa 0.002
ρx 0.998 Markup series ρ
µx 1.0 Markup series µ
σx 0.06 Markup series σ
Note: Calibration is at a monthly frequency. See discussion in Section 4.1.
41
Table 13: Model vs. Data Moments
Moment Model Data Source
rf mean 0.022 0.018 Campbell (2001)
rf std dev 0.029 0.030 Campbell (2001)
rM Sharpe 0.41 0.43 Campbell (2001)
Markup series ρ 0.99 0.9 Corhay, Kung, Schmid (2015)
Markup series µ 0.1413 0.1339 Corhay, Kung, Schmid (2015)
Markup series σ 0.0306 0.0230 Corhay, Kung, Schmid (2015)
Note: See discussion in Section 4.1. Return moments are presented on a monthly basis as in
Zhang (2005) while markup moments are presented at a quarterly frequency as in Corhay, Kung,
and Schmid (2015).
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Table 14: Model Predictions for Returns and Size
CAPM Results
α β
Model Data Model Data
Low R&D/Inv -0.007 -0.016 1.001 0.925
Medium R&D/Inv 0.11 0.084 0.993 1.074
High R&D/Inv 0.18 0.271 1.065 1.270
Size
Model Data
Low R&D/Inv 9.04 9.24
Medium R&D/Inv 3.26 5.68
High R&D/Inv 1 1 (normalized)
Note: Firms divided into three categories by level of R&D/Investment in both data and model.
Size measured as Net PP&E. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per month. Model moments
taken as mean of 1,000 samples of 600 observations, data counterparts also use 600 observations.
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Table 15: Doublesorts on Firm Size and R&D Measures
FF3-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
A
ss
et
s
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.652 -0.337 -0.125 -0.259 0.126 0.778***
(-3.73) (-1.70) (-0.56) (-1.02) (0.44) (2.57)
2
-0.417 0.175 0.341 0.028 0.133 0.550**
(-2.65) (1.17) (1.63) (0.20) (0.69) (2.26)
3
-0.225 -0.089 0.565 0.423 0.433 0.658***
(-1.59) (-0.71) (3.67) (2.76) (2.68) (3.22)
4
-0.212 0.091 0.019 0.119 0.558 0.770***
(-1.96) (0.75) (0.17) (1.00) (4.35) (4.60)
5
-0.047 -0.057 0.045 0.017 0.438 0.484***
(-0.45) (-0.64) (0.51) (0.19) (4.94) (3.08)
FF3-Alpha R&D/Market Equity Quintile
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
A
ss
et
s
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.909 -0.140 -0.079 0.350 0.894 1.782***
(-4.35) (-0.62) (-0.40) (1.53) (2.91) (4.99)
2
0.039 0.255 -0.185 0.236 0.602 0.563*
(0.22) (1.76) (-1.29) (1.44) (2.66) (1.96)
3
0.265 0.238 0.364 0.299 0.428 0.164
(1.70) (1.80) (2.66) (2.17) (2.56) (0.73)
4
0.229 0.158 0.091 0.172 0.245 0.016
(1.78) (1.52) (0.85) (1.43) (1.30) (0.07)
5
0.032 0.236 0.058 0.052 0.029 -0.004
(0.37) (3.23) (0.68) (0.50) (0.23) (-0.02)
Note: Firms sorted ﬁrst into quintiles on Assets and then on quintiles based on R&D measures.
Table reports Fama-French 3-factor value-weighted alphas by group. Alphas are reported as basis
points (bps) per month. In the last column, *** indicates signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** indicates
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These results use the same
data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the value-weighted results presented in the
paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics. Insigniﬁcance of factor for higher asset
quintiles is similar for most other existing R&D measures, including R&D Capital/Market Equity
and R&D/R&D Capital.
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Table 16: R&D/Investment and R&D/Market Equity Similarity Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs R&D/Market Equity Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
&
D
/
In
v
D
ec
il
e
1 51.06% 19.51% 9.28% 5.14% 3.13% 2.31% 2.01% 1.80% 1.99% 3.78%
2 20.92% 24.30% 17.67% 12.27% 7.90% 5.25% 3.44% 2.43% 1.76% 4.06%
3 9.10% 17.45% 18.17% 15.51% 12.25% 9.44% 6.43% 4.50% 3.04% 4.11%
4 5.21% 11.26% 14.83% 15.07% 13.89% 12.00% 9.49% 6.90% 4.89% 6.46%
5 3.70% 8.11% 11.14% 13.06% 14.03% 13.44% 11.87% 10.28% 7.71% 6.66%
6 3.04% 5.96% 8.78% 10.90% 12.74% 13.58% 13.94% 12.49% 10.63% 7.96%
7 2.14% 4.42% 6.90% 9.13% 11.33% 12.97% 14.17% 14.86% 13.81% 10.26%
8 1.77% 3.92% 5.50% 7.86% 9.56% 11.55% 13.79% 15.39% 17.54% 13.11%
9 1.46% 2.84% 4.28% 5.84% 7.95% 10.44% 13.52% 16.44% 19.34% 17.90%
10 1.89% 2.72% 4.07% 5.74% 7.49% 9.24% 11.38% 14.69% 18.93% 23.86%
Note: Value in ijth entry represents the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment decile
in year t is in the jth R&D/Market Equity decile in year t. Firm-year observation level. Numbers
in each row sum to 100% (with possible rounding error).
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Table 17: R&D/Investment and R&D/Sales Similarity Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs R&D/Sales Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
&
D
/
In
v
D
ec
il
e
1 64.61% 20.71% 8.06% 3.14% 1.60% 0.62% 0.35% 0.23% 0.33% 0.34%
2 22.51% 35.18% 19.68% 11.26% 5.21% 2.73% 1.35% 0.85% 0.66% 0.58%
3 6.67% 23.00% 27.07% 19.43% 9.73% 6.04% 3.24% 2.13% 1.57% 1.11%
4 2.42% 10.17% 20.65% 23.00% 17.91% 11.12% 6.41% 3.92% 2.73% 1.67%
5 1.34% 4.59% 10.655 17.78% 20.22% 17.15% 12.06% 8.07% 5.08% 3.07%
6 0.48% 2.27% 5.39% 10.84% 17.45% 19.24% 17.66% 13.64% 8.37% 4.65%
7 0.30% 1.24% 3.16% 6.06% 12.10% 16.86% 19.65% 19.50% 14.45% 6.68%
8 0.10% 0.54% 1.82% 3.50% 7.35% 13.18% 19.28% 22.11% 20.77% 11.25%
9 0.10% 0.40% 1.05% 2.54% 4.78% 8.65% 13.54% 19.39% 25.64% 23.91%
10 0.25% 0.34% 0.84% 1.62% 2.52% 3.79% 6.31% 10.67% 22.27% 51.37%
Note: Value in ijth entry represents the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment decile
in year t is in the jth R&D/Sales decile in year t. Firm-year observation level. Numbers in each
row sum to 100% (with possible rounding error).
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Table 18: R&D/Investment and R&D Capital/Market Equity Similarity Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs R&D Capital/Market Equity Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
&
D
/
In
v
D
ec
il
e
1 45.11% 19.88% 10.98% 6.60% 3.96% 2.73% 2.43% 2.33% 2.32% 3.65%
2 19.42% 21.59% 17.23% 13.44% 9.21% 6.14% 4.19% 2.72% 1.89% 4.16%
3 9.47% 16.09% 16.63% 14.63% 12.79% 10.45% 7.36% 5.13% 3.35% 4.10%
4 6.58% 10.43% 13.43% 13.98% 13.55% 12.07% 10.18% 7.73% 5.45% 6.60%
5 4.96% 8.19% 10.76% 12.52% 12.94% 13.04% 12.11% 10.22% 8.41% 6.86%
6 4.33% 6.77% 8.82% 10.34% 11.83% 12.66% 13.54% 12.67% 10.76% 8.29%
7 3.14% 5.54% 7.28% 9.09% 10.80% 12.21% 13.36% 14.17% 13.94% 10.45%
8 2.84% 4.56% 6.00% 7.78% 9.35% 11.34% 13.35% 15.26% 16.72% 12.79%
9 2.20% 3.84% 4.88% 6.41% 8.30% 10.38% 12.44% 15.32% 18.34% 17.88%
10 2.39% 3.63% 4.61% 5.72% 7.58% 9.18% 10.99% 14.05% 18.41% 23.43%
Note: Value in ijth entry represents the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment decile
in year t is in the jth R&D Capital/Market Equity decile in year t. R&D Capital calculated as
t∑
τ=t−5
(1− .2 ∗ (t− τ))RDτ . Firm-year observation level. Numbers in each row sum to 100% (with
possible rounding error).
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Table 19: R&D/Investment and R&D/R&D Capital Similarity Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs R&D/R&D Capital Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
&
D
/
In
v
D
ec
il
e
1 18.17% 11.07% 10.29% 8.42% 7.57% 7.50% 8.35% 8.18% 12.01% 8.43%
2 10.99% 10.27% 12.17% 10.68% 10.82% 9.79% 9.61% 8.25% 11.20% 6.22%
3 8.57% 9.77% 11.43% 12.27% 11.90% 11.21% 10.05% 8.71% 10.75% 5.34%
4 7.85% 9.01% 10.50% 12.46% 12.24% 11.55% 11.20% 8.96% 11.29% 4.93%
5 7.31% 9.29% 9.69% 11.11% 11.72% 10.76% 11.62% 10.64% 12.46% 5.39%
6 7.27% 8.87% 9.95% 9.84% 11.30% 10.96% 12.03% 11.48% 12.82% 5.48%
7 7.57% 9.29% 9.18% 9.56% 10.72% 10.98% 11.83% 11.38% 13.74% 5.75%
8 7.52% 9.69% 9.44% 9.57% 10.50% 9.97% 11.59% 11.68% 14.62% 5.42%
9 10.05% 10.81% 9.27% 8.41% 8.84% 9.28% 10.49% 11.28% 14.94% 6.63%
10 15.02% 11.60% 8.55% 7.19% 6.69% 7.84% 9.12% 9.94% 15.73% 8.22%
Note: Value in ijth entry represents the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment
decile in year t is in the jth R&D/R&D Capital decile in year t. R&D Capital calculated as
t∑
τ=t−5
(1− .2 ∗ (t− τ))RDτ . Firm-year observation level. Numbers in each row sum to 100% (with
possible rounding error).
48
Table 20: R&D/Investment and Organizational Capital Similarity Matrix
% of R&D/Inv obs SG&A Capital/Assets Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
R
&
D
/
In
v
D
ec
il
e
1 43.24% 15.88% 9.86% 7.01% 6.00% 4.87% 4.24% 3.13% 3.06% 2.73%
2 20.99% 18.94% 14.06% 11.45% 8.79% 7.13% 5.70% 4.78% 4.13% 4.02%
3 11.28% 16.66% 14.81% 14.17% 11.40% 9.35% 7.08% 5.99% 5.71% 3.55%
4 7.46% 13.59% 15.11% 13.85% 13.38% 10.42% 8.74% 7.25% 5.88% 4.33%
5 5.15% 11.23% 12.17% 13.76% 12.58% 12.21% 10.01% 9.20% 8.30% 5.38%
6 3.07% 7.47% 10.73% 11.90% 12.85% 12.60% 13.52% 11.71% 9.67% 6.49%
7 2.63% 5.53% 8.08% 9.49% 11.21% 13.03% 14.41% 14.44% 12.06% 9.12%
8 1.80% 3.96% 6.50% 8.33% 9.89% 12.28% 13.65% 15.54% 15.49% 12.56%
9 1.85% 3.18% 4.46% 6.07% 8.07% 10.61% 12.48% 15.83% 18.18% 19.26%
10 2.22% 3.14% 3.93% 4.09% 6.11% 7.39% 9.92% 12.29% 17.97% 32.94%
Note: Value in ijth entry represents the probability that a ﬁrm in the ith R&D/Investment
decile in year t is in the jth SG&A Capital/Assets decile in year t. Organizational (SG&A) Capital
calculated as
t∑
τ=t−5
(1− .2 ∗ (t− τ))SGAτ . Firm-year observation level. Numbers in each row sum
to 100% (with possible rounding error).
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Table 21: Doublesorts on Gross Proﬁtability and R&D/Investment
FF3-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
G
ro
ss
P
ro
ﬁ
ta
b
il
it
y
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.696 -0.843 -0.802 0.164 -0.695
(-2.43) (-3.14) (-2.85) (0.52) (-2.24)
2
-0.035 0.022 0.294 0.422 0.326
(-0.31) (0.15) (1.75) (2.28) (1.49)
3
-0.125 -0.087 0.197 0.501 0.581
(-1.03) (-0.85) (2.09) (4.02) (3.21)
4
0.081 -0.073 0.134 0.425 0.437
(0.67) (-0.63) (1.20) (3.20) (2.22)
5
0.259 0.365 0.194 0.067 0.529
(1.85) (2.23) (1.05) (0.28) (2.23)
FF5-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
G
ro
ss
P
ro
ﬁ
ta
b
il
it
y
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
0.010 -0.306 -0.419 0.437 -0.512
(0.04) (-1.12) (-1.52) (1.42) (-1.65)
2
0.040 0.426 0.547 0.633 0.612
(0.35) (3.07) (3.09) (3.19) (2.87)
3
-0.162 -0.051 0.215 0.645 0.839
(-1.28) (-0.48) (2.14) (5.00) (4.73)
4
-0.077 -0.134 0.077 0.437 0.698
(-0.64) (-1.11) (0.63) (3.24) (3.46)
5
0.121 0.230 0.267 0.107 0.721
(0.87) (1.31) (1.30) (0.44) (2.93)
Note: Firms sorted ﬁrst into quintiles on Gross Proﬁtability and then on quintiles based on
R&D/Investment. Gross Proﬁtability deﬁned as Revenue/Assets. Table reports Fama-French 3-
factor and 5-factor value-weighted alphas by group. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per
month. These results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the
value-weighted results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 22: Doublesorts on Net Proﬁtability and R&D/Investment
FF3-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
N
et
P
ro
ﬁ
ta
b
il
it
y
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.405 -0.171 0.188 -0.525 0.039
(-1.86) (-0.72) (0.80) (-2.22) (0.15)
2
-0.469 -0.180 -0.061 0.033 0.365
(-3.15) (-1.12) (-0.32) (0.17) (1.65)
3
-0.331 -0.010 -0.097 0.107 0.232
(-2.57) (-0.08) (-0.74) (0.67) (1.23)
4
0.096 -0.212 0.104 0.137 0.359
(0.76) (-2.30) (0.86) (1.24) (2.44)
5
0.014 0.092 0.351 0.336 0.588
(0.12) (0.85) (3.27) (3.32) (3.88)
FF5-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
N
et
P
ro
ﬁ
ta
b
il
it
y
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
0.038 0.431 0.624 -0.185 0.302
(0.17) (1.96) (2.77) (-0.74) (1.19)
2
-0.368 -0.007 0.170 0.346 0.707
(-2.38) (-0.05) (0.89) (1.79) (3.16)
3
-0.280 -0.074 -0.080 0.301 0.411
(-2.12) (-0.54) (-0.58) (1.85) (2.03)
4
0.094 -0.291 0.071 0.155 0.496
(0.71) (-3.11) (0.58) (1.37) (3.22)
5
-0.145 0.004 0.385 0.287 0.719
(-1.19) (0.03) (3.43) (2.72) (4.61)
Note: Firms sorted ﬁrst into quintiles on Net Proﬁtability and then on quintiles based on
R&D/Investment. Net Proﬁtability deﬁned as Net Income/Assets. Table reports Fama-French 3-
factor and 5-factor value-weighted alphas by group. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per
month. These results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the
value-weighted results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 23: Doublesorts on Firm Scaled Investment and R&D/Investment
FF3-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
S
ca
le
d
In
ve
st
m
en
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.559 0.259 -0.187 -1.102 -0.712
(-2.14) (1.03) (-0.77) (-3.57) (-1.71)
2
-0.435 0.161 0.185 -0.270 0.091
(-2.83) (0.78) (1.22) (-1.52) (0.39)
3
-0.070 0.038 -0.025 0.121 0.343
(-0.58) (0.31) (-0.21) (0.86) (2.00)
4
0.006 -0.077 0.101 0.477 0.315
(0.05) (-0.83) (1.06) (3.65) (1.76)
5
0.182 0.255 0.319 0.043 0.771
(1.10) (2.00) (2.04) (0.23) (3.57)
FF5-Alpha R&D/Investment Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
S
ca
le
d
In
ve
st
m
en
t
Q
u
in
ti
le
1
-0.478 0.130 -0.465 -1.004 -0.513
(-1.82) (0.50) (-1.97) (-2.96) (-1.18)
2
-0.449 -0.034 -0.009 -0.216 0.363
(-2.92) (-0.15) (-0.06) (-1.18) (1.40)
3
-0.136 -0.039 -0.048 0.255 0.518
(-1.06) (-0.29) (-0.39) (1.69) (2.78)
4
0.082 -0.037 0.116 0.596 0.467
(0.76) (-0.39) (1.11) (4.42) (2.57)
5
0.429 0.381 0.537 0.265 1.040
(2.70) (2.89) (3.49) (1.36) (4.90)
Note: Firms sorted ﬁrst into quintiles on Scaled Investment and then on quintiles based on
R&D/Investment. Scaled Investment deﬁned as Investment/Assets. Table reports Fama-French
3-factor and 5-factor value-weighted alphas by group. Alphas are reported as basis points (bps)
per month. These results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the
value-weighted results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 24: Fama-French 3-factor and QMJ Results
R&D/Investment Decile
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
α
-0.234 0.081 0.027 0.085 0.011 0.201** 0.142 0.329*** 0.679*** 0.417** 0.973*** 0.892***
(-1.57) (0.81) (0.28) (0.85) (0.12) (2.04) (1.34) (2.72) (4.44) (2.38) (4.92) (3.80)
RMRF 1.195 0.835 1.065 1.038 1.022 0.974 0.979 1.012 0.954 0.899 0.918 0.083
HML 0.241 0.112 0.154 -0.042 -0.151 -0.331 -0.333 -0.459 -0.669 -0.931 -0.937 -1.049
SMB 0.431 -0.304 -0.158 0.067 -0.017 -0.027 0.066 0.122 0.121 0.413 0.595 0.898
QMJ 0.458 -0.229 0.002 -0.034 -0.062 -0.181 0.130 -0.045 -0.346 -0.528 -0.746 -0.758
Note: Table reports value-weighted alphas and betas by deciles of R&D/Investment measure
after controlling for Fama-French 3 factors and QMJ factor of Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014).
Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per month. In the top row, *** indicates signiﬁcant at the
1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These
results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the value-weighted
results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Table 25: Fama-French 3-factor and Momentum Results
R&D/Investment Decile
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
α
0.065 -0.076 0.021 0.129 0.052 0.150 0.196** 0.281** 0.512*** 0.087 0.444** 0.520**
(0.47) (-0.79) (0.24) (1.43) (0.59) (1.56) (2.11) (2.41) (3.50) (0.53) (2.38) (2.41)
RMRF 1.081 0.894 1.065 1.032 1.020 1.005 0.953 1.027 1.027 1.027 1.112 0.219
HML 0.145 0.162 0.156 -0.059 -0.167 -0.317 -0.348 -0.443 -0.617 -0.826 -0.766 -0.928
SMB 0.275 -0.226 -0.158 0.078 0.005 0.035 0.022 0.137 0.238 0.592 0.847 1.073
MOM -0.024 0.020 0.007 -0.069 -0.084 -0.062 0.028 0.022 -0.045 0.012 -0.085 0.064
Note: Table reports value-weighted alphas and betas by deciles of R&D/Investment measure
after controlling for Fama-French 3 factors and Momentum (based on 2-12 month prior return).
Alphas are reported as basis points (bps) per month. In the top row, *** indicates signiﬁcant at the
1% level, ** indicates signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and * indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level. These
results use the same data sample and portfolio construction methodology as the value-weighted
results presented in the paper. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics.
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Figure 5: R&D/Investment Distribution
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Note: Figure plots the histogram of R&D/Investment ﬁrm-year level observations for reported
and nonzero values of R&D. Investment is deﬁned as the sum of R&D expenditures and capital
expenditures; see Section 2.1 for more details. Approximately 50% of the ﬁrm-year observations in
the merged sample have missing R&D values, approximately 17% of those with non-missing values
have zero values. Firm-year observation level.
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of X on Distribution of Consumer Preferences
Note: Figure plots the distribution of consumers' theta prefences under two values of the demand
state variable Xt. Lower values of Xt (blue line) correspond to distributions which skew towards
lower theta values and have fewer high theta values.
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Figure 7: Model Market Shares
Note: Figure plots the model-generated market shares of low- and high-quality ﬁrms as the
preference parameter (Xt) changes. Market shares calculated as the quantity of goods produced
and sold by a given ﬁrm divided by the quantity produced and sold by all ﬁrms. Productivity state
ﬁxed to long-run mean.
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Figure 8: Model Proﬁt Margins
Note: Figure plots the proﬁt margins of low- , medium-, and high-quality ﬁrms as the preference
parameter (Xt) changes. Proﬁt margin calculated as the total proﬁt of a ﬁrm (revenue less rental
costs of capital) divided by the quantity sold. Productivity state ﬁxed to long-run mean.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 can be proved by establishing Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. In any pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, there will be at most one ﬁrm producing products
of a given quality level si ∀i .
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the problem of a ﬁrm seeking to enter that previously did not produce products
of any quality level. Since this ﬁrm is switching quality levels (in the sense that it previously had
no quality level and is now entering a quality level) it must pay some switching costs, denoted by c
(without loss of generality, assume that this cost is the same for ﬁrms switching from no previous
quality level as it is for ﬁrms switching from a diﬀerent previous quality level.) If this ﬁrm enters
a quality level sj where there is an existing ﬁrm producing, then both this new entrant and the
existing ﬁrm will decide to produce the same quantity of products, because these ﬁrms are identical.
Given that these identical ﬁrms are competing for the production of a homogeneous good, they will
compete on the prices they set such that both ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Therefore,
the payoﬀ to the entrant from entering any quality level which has an existing ﬁrm will be −c < 0.
Since this is less than the payoﬀ for not entering at all (0), this new entrant will never choose to
enter a quality level which has an existing ﬁrm.
The comparison for a ﬁrm which is producing products of a diﬀerent quality level si is even
starker. By not switching quality levels, this ﬁrm earns proﬁts pii, which are always weakly positive
since the ﬁrm can choose to produce zero units of goods and rent zero units of capital and thus
earn zero proﬁts. The analysis for the proﬁts of the ﬁrm if it enters a quality level where there is
already an existing ﬁrm is the same as above, and this ﬁrm will earn −c < 0. Since −c < 0 ≤ pii,
this ﬁrm is always strictly better oﬀ by not switching to a quality level where there is an existing
ﬁrm producing goods.
Therefore, no ﬁrm will enter or switch into a quality level where it believes that there will be
another ﬁrm. Since these beliefs are correct in equilibrium, in any pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium,
ﬁrms will have perfect knowledge of the quality levels occupied by every other ﬁrm and will not
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choose to produce products in any of these occupied quality levels. Thus, in any pure-strategy Nash
Equilibrium, there will never be more than one ﬁrm producing products of any given quality level.
Lemma 3. Among all possible Nash Equilibria, the initial allocation where ﬁrm j produces quality
level sj is Pareto-optimal.
Proof. In any pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, there will always be exactly one ﬁrm per quality
level. This is because each quality level is initially occupied by one ﬁrm, and this ﬁrm earns (weakly)
positive proﬁts in every period. As a result, each of these ﬁrms has no incentive to exit, and so will
always remain in the economy. Then, as long as there are at least N ﬁrms in the economy (the initial
number) and N diﬀerent quality levels, if there is no more than one ﬁrm producing products of a
given quality then each quality level will have no fewer than one ﬁrm, by the Pigeonhole Principle.
Combining this with Lemma 2, each quality level will have exactly one ﬁrm in a pure-strategy Nash
Equilibrium.
As a result, any pure strategy Nash Equilibrium consists of an assignment ofN ﬁrms toN quality
levels such that each quality level has exactly one ﬁrm. The initial allocation of ﬁrms such that ﬁrm
j produces quality level sj is one such equilibrium. This equilibrium can be shown to be Pareto
optimal as follows. In this equilibrium, the N ﬁrms earn proﬁt levels pi1, pi2, . . . , pii, pij , . . . , piN .
Any pure strategy modiﬁcation would result in the switching of two proﬁt levels, and the deduction
of c from each. If one proﬁt level is higher than the other, then the ﬁrm which moves from the
higher to the lower proﬁt level will necessarily be worse oﬀ. If the two proﬁt levels are equal, then
the switch results in both ﬁrms paying switching costs and both being worse oﬀ as their proﬁts have
been reduced by c. Thus there exist no pure-strategy modiﬁcations to the initial allocation of ﬁrms
that make one ﬁrm better without making one ﬁrm worse oﬀ. Note that this is not necessarily the
case with other equilibria because if those equilibria involve the switching of ﬁrms, then reducing
those switching costs can potentially make multiple ﬁrms better oﬀ without harming other ﬁrms.
For example, if pii = pij and the Nash Equilibrium involved ﬁrms i and j switching quality levels,
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then a Pareto improvement on this would be for ﬁrm i to stay at quality level si and ﬁrm j to stay
at quality level sj .
There also exist mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria where some ﬁrms have probabilities of occupying
various quality levels. Note that none of these equilibria represent a Pareto improvement over the
initial allocation either. This can be seen in many ways, but one way is to examine the aggregate
proﬁt. The aggregate proﬁt under any mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium will be weakly lower than
that under the initial allocation. This is explained by several components. First, since ﬁrms make
identical quantity decisions once they are put into a given quality level, if there are quality levels
with only one ﬁrm under the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium, then the ﬁrms in those quality levels
will earn the same proﬁts as the ﬁrms in those quality levels under the initial allocation, less any
switching costs. Therefore the proﬁts of these ﬁrms will be weakly lower. Second, if there are quality
levels with multiple ﬁrms, the ﬁrms in those quality levels will earn zero proﬁts, again weakly lower
than under the initial allocation. If the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium involves any switching
at allthat is, if there are any ﬁrms that use mixed strategiesthen the aggregate proﬁts will be
strictly lower. In such a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium, these lower proﬁts can be split among
a greater, lower, or equal number of ﬁrms. If the lower proﬁts are split among a greater or equal
number of ﬁrms, then it is clear that some ﬁrms must be worse under this equilibrium than in the
initial allocation. If they are split among fewer ﬁrms, then there are some ﬁrms that would earn
positive proﬁts under the initial allocation (since all ﬁrms under the initial allocation earn strictly
positive proﬁts) who now earn zero proﬁts.
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